

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

18667



November 10, 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Brazilian Proposal for Latin American  
Denuclearized Zone

1. Brazil has now tabled at the General Assembly a revised resolution (TAB A) favoring the establishment of denuclearized zones by action of the Latin Americans and (separately) the African nations.

2. The African element of this resolution is not satisfactory, since it merely repeats last year's resolution on the subject, on which we had to abstain. We may still succeed in eliminating this reference to last year's resolution, or at least keeping it confined to the preamble.

3. On the Latin American Zone, we see three stages in its development:

First, the Brazilian resolution would be passed by the General Assembly, probably within the next ten days. The resolution would not establish the Zone, but would provide an Assembly blessing to Latin American efforts to establish it.

Second, an ad hoc conference of all Latin American countries, including Cuba, would be called to adopt a self-denying ordinance on the acquisition of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The United States (as a nation of the region), the U.K., France and the Netherlands (in view of their dependent territories in the region) would also participate in such a conference.

Third, the ad hoc conference would also ask the Secretary General of the UN to establish a UN presence to serve as the inspection system for the Zone and generally to make sure that its members were abiding by the agreed restraints.

4. If Cuba

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4. If Cuba would join in support of such a resolution and in the subsequent conference, including the inspection system, this might offer a face-saving way for Cuba (and the Soviet Union) to agree to the long-term safeguards which we are demanding against the reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. A more detailed summary of the concept by which this might be done is attached as TAB B.

5. In an address to the General Assembly earlier this session, the Cubans have already come out in favor of the principle of a denuclearized zone in Latin America (TAB C). The Brazilians are now approaching the Cubans, through the Cuban Ambassador in Rio, to see whether they would cooperate in such a plan. We would support the resolution in any case, in view of its relationship to the U.S. interest in limiting the proliferation of national nuclear capabilities. But we would not encourage the calling of the ad hoc conference unless the Cubans were willing to cooperate.

6. The Department of State is therefore encouraging the Brazilians to proceed with the resolution, but urging that they seek to obtain the concurrence of Cuba. If the Brazilians succeed in obtaining Cuban support, especially for the subsequent conference to establish the inspection system, we could, if necessary, move rapidly from passage of the resolution to the ad hoc conference and the establishment of the UN presence as executive agent of the Zone. If Cuban support is not obtained we will, while still supporting the resolution in the General Assembly, avoid giving any impetus to the subsequent ad hoc conference unless and until Cuban cooperation was forthcoming.

Dean Rusk

Copies to: NSC Executive Committee.

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BRAZIL: Draft Resolution (Introduced in Committee I. November 8)

The General Assembly, bearing in mind the vital necessity of sparing present and future generations the scourge of a nuclear war;

Deeply concerned with current development in the international situation which promotes the spread of nuclear weapons to new geographic areas;

Believing that urgent action should be taken to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons;

Recalling resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 which recognized the need to prevent Africa from becoming involved in the arms race and considered the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone;

Considering that the dangers and threats lying in the present world crisis make it imperative that all member states in the Latin American area should consider among themselves arrangements to establish Latin America as a denuclearized zone, thus preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons;

Recognizing the need to prevent the countries of Africa and Latin America from becoming involved in the nuclear arms race, which jeopardizes world peace and is causing deep anxiety to all peoples and nations;

1. Reaffirms resolution 1652 (XVI), of 24 November 1961, regarding the consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone;

2. Recommends that the countries of Latin America, through the means and channels which will be found most appropriate, negotiate arrangements whereby the countries in the area would:

(A) Agree not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or carrying devices;

(B) Agree to dispose forthwith of any nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery vehicles which may now be in territory under their jurisdiction;

(C) Make provision for such verification of these arrangements as may be agreed in order to ensure that they are in fact being observed;

3. Calls upon

3. Calls upon all states to cooperate in full with the arrangements to be reached and in accordance therewith to consider and respect the territory of Latin America as a denuclearized zone;

4. Requests the Secretary General, upon request of those states, to assist them to reach and implement the arrangements referred to in paragraph 3.

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Long-Term Verification Measures Regarding Cuba

This paper sketches out a method for combining OAS, UN, and ad hoc Western Hemisphere nuclear free zone arrangements to provide long-term inspection insuring that nuclear weapons and delivery means are not reintroduced into Cuba. It is assumed that the United States should be a party to such arrangements in order to participate in sanctions.

Step 1 -- It is assumed that the Brazilian resolution is adopted by the General Assembly. The resolution provides, inter alia, that nations of the region concerned should work out arrangements, and also that the Secretary General of the UN should make himself available to carry out any arrangements for administration and inspection that might be involved.

Step 2 -- The Council of the OAS would be called into session to endorse the idea of establishing a denuclearized zone, and either the Council or some member or members -- say, Brazil -- could informally be designated to convene a special ad hoc conference either in Latin America or in New York. All members of the OAS, Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad, the UK, France, and the Netherlands, would be invited.

Step 3 -- The ad hoc meeting, including the US and Cuba, would meet and reach agreement on a multilateral treaty providing that "those American Republics which did not possess nuclear weapon capabilities at the time of their adherence to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance" would undertake and agree not to acquire or permit basing of nuclear weapons and delivery means.

The countries with dependencies in the area would assume an obligation not to permit stationing of nuclear weapons in their territories in the Zone. (This would presumably not cause any problem for the UK, France, or the Netherlands; it would, however, presumably be necessary to make clear that US possessions, or at least the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, was not included in such an undertaking.)

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The ad hoc conference would request the Secretary General of the UN to assist them by establishing a UN presence to check on compliance by the countries of the zone which had undertaken not to own or serve as hosts for nuclear weapons.

The treaty establishing a demuclearized zone would set forth the obligations summarized above, set forth guidelines for verification of the treaty obligations, and provide the necessary sanctions.

Any participating member could report suspicion of a violation to the SYG of the UN, who would then direct that an inspection promptly be made to determine whether a violation had occurred. The inspection itself would be conducted by technically competent neutrals selected (perhaps from a predetermined panel) by the SYG. (Appropriate neutrals would include Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan.) The inspectors would operate on the basis of guidelines for verification set up in the treaty itself, and would include aerial and surface observation as necessary. The inspectors would then report whatever evidence they had found, and would report whether they had been given sufficient access to investigate the suspected violation. A Zonal Continuing Committee, composed of representatives of the participating states, would then decide by majority vote that (a) a violation had occurred or must be presumed to have occurred as a result of refusal of cooperation by the suspected state, or (b) that no violation had occurred. In the event that the Committee decided that a violation had occurred or must be presumed to have occurred the treaty itself would provide automatic sanction. The proven or presumptive violation would be defined by the treaty itself to constitute a threat to the peace authorizing individual or collective self defense. (The OAS members would understand this as invoking Article 8 of the Rio Treaty.)

Alternatively, the treaty could provide that the inspectors themselves report that a violation had occurred, had not occurred, or that they had been refused sufficient cooperation to determine. In this case, there would be no need for reference to a Committee of the participating states, and sanction would be automatically authorized as above.

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The Denuclearization Obligation -- The obligation assumed by the nonnuclear participating states should be stated as follows:

Not to acquire or seek to acquire nuclear weapons, not to acquire or seek to acquire missiles or aircraft designed for carrying such weapons, and not to construct launching facilities for such missiles; and not to permit the storage, stationing, manufacture, or testing of such weapons or delivery vehicles, or construction of such facilities in territory under their jurisdiction and control.

UN.

Our Man in Havana -- Assuming that Cuba participates, and if the Cubans would prefer or not object, a UN presence on behalf of the zonal states might be established in Havana. This would not, of course, be essential, but it would be convenient. Castro, for his part, might find some advantage in such an arrangement as a deterrent to invasion.

Other Assurances -- The question of a US or OAS commitment not to invade Cuba or to respect Cuban independence should not be linked with the denuclearized zone.

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Excerpt from October 29 First Committee Speech  
by  
Mr. Garcia-Inchaustegui, Cuba

"Regarding the denuclearized or atom-free zones, we are very much in favour of them; we believe that it would be a very correct thing to do, but the best thing would be to turn our entire planet, in its atmosphere, in its outer space, under its water and under its ground into a true atom-free planet, free of all types of tests and of all nature."